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 I. INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis of 2008–2009 should—and doubtless does—
stand out in our minds for a number of reasons. One of those reasons, to 
be sure, was the shockingly steep and seemingly unrelenting fall in stock 
prices world over. If that were not significant enough on its own, the fi-
nancial crisis was glaring evidence of striking deficiencies in the opera-
tion of the economy as a whole. Not only had stock prices fallen, but the 
“system” had also revealed itself to be unstable. Risk-mitigation practic-
es, combined with insufficient regulation of those practices, meant that 
no one had to bear any risk at all, which, of course, perversely meant 
that, in the end, everyone bore risk—a lot of it, at that. 
And so, in the post-financial-crisis months and years, the systemic 
weaknesses that became evident have been explored, investigated, diag-
nosed, and, supposedly, remedied. We have learned much about the ex-
tent to which mortgage lending and securitization practices built a giant 
housing bubble. We have learned about how lending companies failed to 
conduct diligence on borrowers and, to the contrary, determined that that 
diligence was unnecessary and counterproductive. We have learned that 
the same creativity in financial products that fueled the housing bubble 
also served to heighten risk in all quadrants of the economy, as financial-
services companies used “repo” financing to take on trillions of dollars 
of exposure from credit default swaps and other financial instruments, 
whether to hedge actual risk or simply to speculate. We have learned, 
moreover, that firms’ positions in these instruments and the massive lev-
erage that permitted them were often off regulators’ radar screens, as part 
of the “shadow” banking system that was the topic of many a congres-
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sional hearing when lawmakers formulated the Dodd-Frank Act.1 Indeed, 
so many untoward circumstances and conditions had been accumulating 
in the system that the financial crisis, in retrospect, seems all but ex-
pected, even though, at the time of its onset, it was anything but. 
In other words, transferred risk, unregulated financial-services insti-
tutions and activities, complex and creative financial instruments, con-
flicts of interest, and illegal mortgage-lending practices—symbiotic fac-
tors in the financial crisis—are what, for many of us, stand out about the 
crisis and lessons to be learned from it. And although it may be easy to 
think of the financial crisis as the “black swan” event that many observ-
ers have claimed it to be, that proposition is dubious. There surely will be 
another financial crisis, and it may well be not far off, regardless of the 
additional laws and regulations that have come into being since 2008.2 
Moreover, given the financial crisis’s roots in systemic instability 
and its effects on the broader economy, some of the biggest losers in the 
crisis likely will be some of the biggest losers in any future financial cri-
sis: shareholders—shareholders of financial-services holding companies, 
that is. That is awkward terminology, but one need only think of Lehman 
Brothers and Bear Stearns to grasp its meaning. Financial-services hold-
ing companies (FSHCs)3 are publicly traded companies that engage in 
business activities unlike what we—or, at least, much of the public—
generally think of as “business.” What do FSHCs do? Nothing, really, if 
we conceive of a firm’s “doing” something as producing tangible goods 
or providing services to others. Rather, the activity to which FSHCs ap-
pear mostly, if not exclusively, devoted is the investment of their own 
capital, a practice called (and notoriously so, in the wake of debates 
about the “Volcker Rule” under the Dodd-Frank Act4) “proprietary trad-
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ing.”5 These firms, regardless of whether they are “too big to fail” or en-
gage in activities backed by government guarantees, present substantial 
risks to their shareholders. 
Amid the recent flurry of policymaking and concerns about how the 
activities of financial institutions may dramatically affect the rest of the 
economy, and handwringing about how regulators are ill-equipped and 
inadequately motivated to hold key players accountable, neither scholars 
nor commentators have focused on the corporate governance implica-
tions of FSHCs’ activities. This Article’s goal is to revisit early and 
thoughtful commentary on the fundamental problem of the large corpo-
rate enterprise—managerial accountability to shareholders—to show that 
this fundamental problem is dramatically pronounced—magnified, if you 
will—in the types of enterprises that were at the center of the financial 
crisis, whether too big to fail or not. In particular, The Modern Corpora-
tion articulated that the evolution of economic organization has separated 
the beneficial ownership of property from those who control it and that 
this disjunction has created an irresolvable tension between shareholders 
and management.6 Nowhere is that tension more pronounced than in the 
context of FSHCs, raising questions regarding whether the standard tools 
of corporate governance are equipped to address it. 
This Article first recalls the primary contours of Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means’s acclaimed observations regarding the separation of 
ownership and control in the “modern corporation,” as well as their con-
clusions about the implications of those observations for the doctrine of 
shareholder primacy. Second, the Article describes how the activities of 
FSHCs generally differ from what we think corporations do and, certain-
ly, from what Berle and Means conceived of as the purpose of corpora-
tions or, indeed, any business enterprise. In particular, rather than de-
ploying physical property for the purpose of producing goods or provid-
ing services and, beyond that, creating economic value for the property’s 
ultimate owners, FSHCs deploy their and their customers’ and clients’ 
financial assets for the purpose of generating profits through trading and 
investment activities. 
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 6. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
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Third, this Article articulates how those business activities render 
more acute the problem of the separation of ownership and control that 
Berle and Means observed. In particular, FSHC shareholders face addi-
tional peril as a result of managerial incentives that cultivate excessive 
risk-taking, which is often difficult to temper, and heavy regulation, 
which raises the prospect of both regulatory enforcement actions and 
regulatory capture—all fueled by rules under the Bankruptcy Code that, 
in the event of insolvency, limit a firm’s rights to recoup assets trans-
ferred in its final days.7 Additional risk derives from FSHCs’ relation-
ships to their subsidiaries, which typically do carry on activities that fall 
within the more traditional role of corporate activity, such as performing 
broker–dealer or banking services. This discussion highlights that, be-
cause FSHCs are an evolved specimen of the modern corporation, there 
should be heightened concern regarding the possibility that FSHC man-
agers may not be looking after shareholders’ best interests. 
Finally, this Article concludes that the special concerns that FSHCs 
produce both portend and necessitate rethinking the problem of manage-
rial accountability in large, publicly traded corporations. The Article 
suggests, consistent with Berle and Means’s conclusions, that the notion 
of shareholder primacy should be supplanted—but does so without nec-
essarily embracing the notion that corporations should be managed in the 
interests of innumerable constituencies. Rather, the Article raises the 
possibility that many of the concerns associated with FSHCs’ activities 
could be addressed through a greater governance focus on one constitu-
ency, in particular: those who seek out, and benefit from, FSHCs’ tradi-
tional and foundational business operations—namely, clients and cus-
tomers. 
II. THE MODERN CORPORATION 
The Modern Corporation is standard reading for any serious stu-
dent of corporate governance. Accordingly, it is worth revisiting the 
book’s arguments only as a reminder of Berle and Means’s main premis-
es and enduring insights and of the conclusions those insights ultimately 
allowed the authors to reach. Berle and Means articulated themes of evo-
lution and transition to a new mode of enterprise, one that was itself po-
tentially subject to further evolution as firms and their managers pursued 
activities that the authors could not have foreseen.8 In particular, Berle 
and Means saw that, as the attributes of property had changed, so had the 
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relationship between those who owned property and those who con-
trolled it.9 (Indeed, arguably a jarring indicator of those changes was the 
new need to speak of ownership and control as separate groups.) Those 
changes, they discerned, had profound implications for both the function 
of the stock markets and the traditional “orientation” of the firm toward 
profit maximization and shareholder value.10 
Berle and Means began their project with their study of the changes 
wrought to “property” as a result of the growth of the corporate form of 
enterprise. They wrote that “[t]he corporation has . . . become both a 
method of property tenure and a means of organizing economic life.”11 
One of the most important effects of that transition has been a “division 
of the functions formerly accorded to ownership.”12 Whereas the share-
holders beneficially own the corporation’s property, only the corpora-
tion’s managers have power over the property and the ability to act with 
respect to it.13 In other words, accompanying the rise and increasing eco-
nomic dominance of corporations has been the concentration of econom-
ic power in a small group of individuals whose relationship to property 
arises only through their having been appointed to particular positions 
rather than through their own economic resources. Conversely, property 
owners are now dispersed and, apart from their holding a few residual 
rights, virtually powerless to control that which they own.14 
Moreover, if owners do not have “appreciable control,” and control 
does not have “appreciable ownership,” there arises the question of what 
is the relationship between the two groups and, more particularly, wheth-
er their respective interests are aligned.15 Certainly, observed Berle and 
Means, we can discern owners’ interests, which are that the corporation 
earn maximum profit and that owners receive as large a portion of profits 
as is practicable and retain the ability to sell their shares for a fair price.16 
The interests of control are another matter, but there is ample reason to 
believe that, lacking substantial ownership, managers may lack adequate 
incentives to further owners’ interests and, instead, may be inclined to 
pursue their own.17 In other words, the separation of ownership from 
                                                     
 9. See infra notes 15–35 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 11. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 6, at 1. 
 12. Id. at 119. 
 13. Id. Meanwhile, “[t]he position of the owner has been reduced to that of having a set of legal 
and factual interests in the enterprise while the group which we have called control, are in the posi-
tion of having legal and factual powers over it.” Id. at 120. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. at 121. 
 16. See id. 
 17. See id. at 121–22. 
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control has allowed those in control to use their powers against the inter-
ests of ownership.18 Because that separation is a creature of law, moreo-
ver, there arises at least the appearance that “the diversion of profit into 
the hands of the controlling group” is not only an expected consequence 
but also a perfectly legal one.19 
Indeed, as the authors more succinctly posited, “the shareholder in 
the modern corporate situation has surrendered a set of definite rights for 
a set of indefinite expectations.”20 Shareholders can have no more than a 
“loose expectation” that managers will operate the firm in shareholders’ 
interests.21 In fact, we might now think of shareholders as similar to 
bondholders, in that both groups are part of a common hierarchy of capi-
tal suppliers who expect a return on their capital and whose expectations 
are based on rights set forth in a contract with the corporation.22 In addi-
tion, in the case of both groups, the corporation’s needs for additional 
capital—if it ultimately has such needs, something out of capital suppli-
ers’ control—limits the extent to which management may “abuse” either 
bondholders or shareholders.23 
Of course, if there be risks associated with owners’ placing control 
of “their” property in the hands of another, those risks may be worth tak-
ing, so long as there remains the prospect that a shareholder may obtain a 
repayment of capital by disposing of her ownership interest. Hence, not-
ed Berle and Means, “mobility” in the securities markets—the ability of 
shareholders to rid themselves of further risk associated with their own-
ership interests—is important.24 And, hence, the public securities markets 
are similarly important. Both intuitively and in fact, “mobility decreases 
as . . . the size of the unit of property sought to be made liquid increas-
es,”25 a circumstance that amply supports the divvying up of ownership 
interests into discrete shares of stock.26 With the device known as a share 
of ownership, one need not be “married” to his property as is the case 
                                                     
 18. See id. at 123–25. 
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denies the ultimate trusteeship of the controlling group, nor even faintly implies that such a group 
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 20. Id. at 277. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. at 279. 
 23. See id. at 280–81. 
 24. See id. at 280–83. 
 25. Id. at 283. 
 26. See id. 
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with the sole proprietor who cannot “absent himself very much.”27 Con-
versely, property whose productivity may be elicited only through its 
owner’s work and attention is likely to be immobile.28 
For property to be mobile, however, “the relation of the owner to it 
must necessarily play little part”; the property cannot depend on its own-
er for its value but, instead, must be “impersonal.”29 The authors de-
scribed how shareholders’ access to mobile property depends on con-
trol’s maintenance of immobile property: 
The separation of ownership from management and control in the 
corporate system has performed this essential step in securing li-
quidity. It is the management and “control” which is now wedded to 
the physical property. . . . The management is more or less perma-
nent, directing the physical property which remains intact while the 
participation privileges of ownership are split into innumerable 
parts—“shares of stock”—which glide from hand to hand, irrespon-
sible and impersonal. . . . Two forms of property appear, one above 
the other, related but not the same. At the bottom is the physical 
property itself, still immobile, still there, still demanding the service 
of human beings, managers, and operators. Related to this is a set of 
tokens, passing from hand to hand, liquid to a degree, requiring lit-
tle or no human attention, which attain an actual value in exchange 
or market price only in part dependent upon the underlying proper-
ty.30 
Tokens—the property that shareholders own—are quite different 
from the “physical property” on which the enterprise is based.31 As an 
initial matter, the tokens’ value is merely derivative of the value of the 
underlying property that the tokens represent.32 Beyond that, however, 
their value is affected by a number of factors: the capabilities of those 
managing the underlying property, token buying and selling activity 
based on speculation or artificial manipulation, and shareholders’ expec-
tations as to the rights attached to the tokens, such as preemptive rights in 
connection with new issuances, dividend rights, and voting rights.33 
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 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 284. 
 30. Id. at 285. 
 31. See id. at 285–86. 
 32. See id. at 285 (“Curious as it may seem, the fact appears to be that liquid property, at least 
under the corporate system, obtains a set of values in exchange, represented by market prices, which 
are not immediately dependent upon, or at least only obliquely connected with, the underlying values 
of the properties themselves.”). 
 33. Id. at 286–87. 
828 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:821 
“Most striking of all,” though, a token’s value is based on the very fact of 
its liquidity.34 Thus, it is the factors that have little or no relationship with 
the underlying physical property that are paramount to shareholders and, 
therefore, that constitute the foundation of the securities markets.35 
Having established that shareholder value is only loosely based on 
the value and productivity of the corporation’s physical property, the au-
thors, at last, were able to ask: “Who should receive the profits of indus-
try”?36 In whose interests, in other words, should the country’s large cor-
porations be operated—those of shareholders or perhaps, instead, those 
of “some other or wider group”?37 In light of “[t]he extensive separation 
of ownership and control, and the strengthening of the powers of con-
trol,” it is not difficult to see how this is the question with which the 
reader is left.38 Beyond the difficulties arising from the divergence of 
controllers’ interests from those of shareholders is the undermining of the 
traditional logic of property, which, according to Berle and Means, no 
longer applies. Must it be the case, they ask, that one who has given up 
control of his own property should be protected to the same extent as a 
property owner who has retained and exercises control?39 Allocating 
profits to shareholders beyond what is sufficient to ensure their continued 
supplying of capital seems not to perform any useful economic func-
tion.40 
Turning to the other side of the equation—control—the separation 
of ownership and control, in its denying control a stake in the profits, 
subverts the traditional incentive of property owners to deploy that prop-
erty for the most efficient and productive uses.41 Berle and Means sug-
gested the ultimate implications of these observations: 
[I]f profits have any influence as a motivating force, any surplus 
which can be made over a satisfactory return to the investor would 
be better employed when held out as an incentive to action by con-
trol than when handed over to the “owners” who have surrendered 
control. . . . The traditional logic of profits, when thus applied to the 
                                                     
 34. Id. at 286. The authors described in greater detail the relationship between value and liquid-
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token.” Conversely, they observed that “the very sensitiveness of the value of liquid property to 
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 35. See id. at 287. 
 36. Id. at 333. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. at 339. 
 40. See id. at 343. 
 41. See id. at 341. 
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modern corporation, would indicate that if profits must be distribut-
ed either to the owners or to the control, only a fair return to capital 
should be distributed to the “owners”; while the remainder should 
go to the control as an inducement to the most efficient ultimate 
management. The corporation would thus be operated financially in 
the interests of control, the stockholders becoming merely the recip-
ients of the wages of capital.42 
This possible reorientation of property relationships, too, is suspect, 
as the authors readily admit:43 “Modification of the principle of private 
property”44 to allow control to divert profits to themselves is a far less 
desirable result than requiring control to act as “trustees” solely in the 
interests of “inactive and irresponsible security owners.”45 Fortunately, 
however, there are more than two options, in that “eliminating the sole 
interest of the passive owner . . . does not necessarily lay a basis for the 
alternative claim that [managerial power] should be used in the interest 
of the controlling groups.”46 The way out of the choice—or, more accu-
rately, the conundrum—is to avoid it altogether, for there is another ap-
proach.47 
Separation of ownership and control, by permitting control’s ex-
pansion of its own powers and reducing ownership’s claim to the full 
rewards of supplying capital, anchors the alternative notion that the mod-
ern corporation should serve “not alone the owners or the control but all 
society”:48 
It is conceivable, —indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate 
system is to survive, —that the “control” of the great corporations 
should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a varie-
ty of claims by various groups in the community and assigning to 
each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy ra-
ther than private cupidity.49 
This concept makes sense if the corporation, like the state, is a form of 
“social organization”—one that, indeed, may be seen as competing with 
the state for dominance.50 Berle and Means suggested that the corpora-
tion is exactly that with their observation that corporations pervade all 
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aspects of individuals’ lives.51 If that is the case, then it is no great leap to 
think of corporate law as a variant of constitutional law and of the com-
peting interests of society as the foundations on which corporate law 
should be based. The corporation, in other words, could (should) be con-
ceived of as a mini-society, one that infiltrates and affects all of its mem-
bers and that must balance the interests of each social constituency. The 
question that the authors could not have addressed is whether and how 
that conclusion might change when the brittle connection between own-
ership and control becomes still further compromised, as it does in the 
case of FSHCs. 
III. PROPRIETARY TRADING 
As discussed in Part II, The Modern Corporation’s analysis of cor-
porations and its ultimate prescriptions for the role of corporations in 
society stemmed from the authors’ observation that, in the corporate con-
text, the nature of property ownership had fundamentally changed. 
Whereas the shareholder once held actual property over which she might 
exert control and deploy for a productive function, the shareholder now 
holds simply “a piece of paper” representing her rights and entitlements 
as to a firm and its property—property over which she now has no con-
trol.52 For Berle and Means, that altered status meant that owners could 
no longer play a role in manipulating and engaging property in the name 
of producing goods or providing services for the benefit and consump-
tion of clients and customers in the market place.53 
Berle and Means’s concerns about the separation of ownership 
from control over property reveal a notion of property as largely tangible 
and physical. It is perhaps a natural conception, given their juxtaposition 
of the productive property of the enterprise with the (flimsy and de-
structible) property that modern shareholders possess. Put another way, 
in the evolution of the modern enterprise, traditional property owners 
gave up something tangible for something intangible and are all the 
worse off for having done so. The authors’ case may have been more 
challenging to make if what property owners had relinquished for their 
new slips of paper were, simply, other slips of paper. Perhaps partly for 
that reason, Berle and Means put banking and other financial firms off to 
                                                     
 51. See id. at 24–26 (observing that “[t]he individual must come in contact with [corporations] 
almost constantly,” in that he may be a shareholder, an employee, or a customer of them and, “above 
all, . . . is continually accepting their service”). 
 52. See supra notes 15–35 and accompanying text. 
 53. See id. 
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the side throughout their study, focusing instead on “non-banking” or 
“non-financial” corporations.54 
Having recognized the existence of financial firms, however, Berle 
and Means presumably could have addressed them, fitting them within 
their analysis alongside utilities and manufacturing firms. Of course, 
whether financial corporations gave rise to the same concerns the authors 
observed in other contexts would have depended on whether the financial 
firms resembled other large firms, in terms of their ownership structures 
and their business activities. Regardless of what may have been the case 
in the early 1930s, neither condition would seem to present particular 
difficulties today. Indeed, when many people think of the activities of 
firms such as J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America, for 
example, they likely think of firms that are publicly held and that are en-
gaged in a variety of financial-services activities. In particular, they may 
think of underwriting or brokerage activities, whereby the firms serve as 
intermediaries between buyers and sellers of securities, earning commis-
sions as their compensation. Or, perhaps, in a similar vein, they think of 
deal-promotion activities—the business of bringing together two firms 
that are interested in pursuing a business combination. Less obviously, 
“market making” may come to mind. That is, rather than being a mid-
dleman, as a broker is, a firm may act as a dealer, in the sense that it may 
buy and sell certain securities as a principal in a manner that facilitates 
liquidity in the securities markets. Those who are familiar with the public 
offering process will likely also think of these firms’ roles as underwrit-
ers, which take on the risk of finding buyers for the securities to be is-
sued in an offering. 
There is something about many financial corporations, however, 
that pushes the limits and enlarges the implications of The Modern Cor-
poration’s analysis. In particular, financial corporations involve “holding 
company” structures. As the descriptive label “holding” implies, such a 
company is a parent company—one that carries out financial-services 
activities but that (usually) does so only indirectly, through its various 
subsidiaries.55 The subsidiaries’ activities include those we envision bro-
kerage firms pursuing—such as broker–dealer, underwriting, and in-
                                                     
 54. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 6, at ch.3. 
 55. See James A. Fanto, “Breaking up is Hard to Do”: Should Financial Conglomerates Be 
Dismantled?, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 553, 553 (2010) (“Many securities firms, which are regulated as 
broker-dealers, operate within the [financial] conglomerate structure.”); Howell E. Jackson, The 
Expanding Obligations of Financial Holding Companies, 107 HARV. L. REV. 507, 509 (1994) 
(“[T]oday’s financial giants—whether NationsBank or Merrill Lynch or Fidelity Investments—now 
operate in multiple sectors of the industry, typically through a network of subsidiaries specializing in 
deposit-taking, insurance underwriting, securities activities, and various other financial services.”). 
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vestment-banking activities—but may also include providing financial 
planning or other investment advisory services. For example, Goldman 
Sachs has a number of subsidiaries that perform these varied roles: 
Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing is an entity within the broker–
dealer “arm,” while Goldman Sachs Asset Management provides in-
vestment advisory services, including sponsoring hedge funds and 
providing discretionary investment advice to institutional investors.  
The subsidiary structure allows the firm as a whole to pursue its 
various activities through separate entities. One reason for separating 
activities by putting them in different entities may be to alleviate con-
flicts of interest—both the appearance and the fact of them—that could 
arise if one regulated subsidiary and its personnel carried out multiple 
disparate functions, such as underwriting or investment-banking activity, 
on one hand, and brokerage activity, on the other. Another rationale, al-
beit more pedestrian, also seems evident: housing separate activities in 
separate entities may help insulate the assets associated with one activity 
from the liabilities associated with another activity. Finally, separate sub-
sidiaries may be necessary to the extent that activities are conducted 
overseas. Non-U.S. activities typically counsel in favor of organizing an 
entity in the host country and submitting that entity to the foreign gov-
ernment’s financial-services regulatory regime.56 (The parent company, 
by contrast, is often not regulated and, therefore, cannot itself provide 
financial services to third parties.) 
All of these circumstances raise the question of what, exactly, the 
parent company does, or whether it does anything at all. Prior to the on-
set of the financial crisis, at least, one might have thought that the parent 
company’s “activities” and profits were simply reducible to the activities 
and profits of its financial-services subsidiaries. If so, however, one 
would have been mistaken. While the profits and losses of the parent—
the holding company—include those of the subsidiaries, the parent com-
pany has its own project, one that, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
has become rather notorious: the pursuit of profit through proprietary 
trading, whether conducted directly or through designated branches, divi-
sions, units, or subsidiaries, including ones based in non-U.S. jurisdic-
                                                     
 56. Cf. Susan Schmidt Bies, Remarks by Governor Susan Schmidt Bies, 37 CONN. L. REV. 715, 
715–16 (2005) (noting that “[a]s large U.S. banks have expanded their international operations, they 
have also become subject to supervision in their host countries,” and that “as foreign banking organ-
izations, in a continuing expansion of their presence in the United States, have established branches 
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tions.57 Proprietary trading, as its name suggests, is the activity of trading 
and investing on one’s own behalf.58 When a firm pursues proprietary 
trading strategies, it uses its own assets, which may include assets that it 
has acquired through borrowing from other financial firms or from the 
firm’s clients and customers.59 For present purposes, the important aspect 
of proprietary trading is not simply that FSHCs engage in it but that they 
may do so for purposes entirely unrelated to the business purposes men-
tioned above (that is, for purposes other than, say, to hedge risk). More 
importantly still, they often do so to an extent that the assets involved 
may rival, if not dwarf, the other, more traditional business activities car-
ried out by the FSHCs’ subsidiaries.60 Those activities are the basis of the 
modern corporation, magnified. 
The lure of proprietary trading may be discerned by considering the 
incentives behind it. First, let us consider the economics of financial-
services activities. When a financial firm acts on behalf of a client, the 
profits that the firm may earn depend on what, exactly, the firm is doing 
for the client. If the firm is bringing together parties in a major deal, the 
firm will typically receive as compensation a percentage of the deal 
price. If the firm is acting as a broker in a securities transaction, the firm 
will likewise receive a commission for its efforts. Similarly, when the 
firm acts as a dealer, buying or selling a security for which it is a market 
maker, the firm will receive commission-like compensation, in that the 
price will reflect a “spread”—the difference between the price at which 
the firm will sell a security and the price at which it will buy the securi-
ty61—that will go to the firm. Finally, when the firm manages a client’s 
assets, it receives as compensation a percentage of assets managed or 
profits achieved for the client—but it must adhere to an investment strat-
egy that is consistent with the client’s investment objectives, however 
staid and conservative those objectives might be. 
                                                     
 57. See, e.g., Ben Protess, Citing JPMorgan Loss, Regulator Pushes New Oversight, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (May 21, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/21/citing-jpmorgan-loss-
regulator-pushes-new-oversight/ (noting that, although J.P. Morgan had executed problematic pro-
prietary trades from its London-based branch, the U.S. holding company was “absorbing these loss-
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 58. See CARPENTER & MURPHY, supra note 4. 
 59. See infra notes 128–131 and accompanying text. 
 60. See, e.g., In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215–VCG, 2011 WL 
4826104, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (“In 1999, [Goldman’s] trading and principal investment 
segment generated 43% of Goldman’s revenue; by 2007 the segment generated over 76% of Gold-
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 61. See Bid-Ask Spread, INVESTINGANSWERS, http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-
dictionary/stock-market/bid-ask-spread-887 (last visited Sept. 3, 2012). 
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Now, let us remove the client—and her peculiar preferences and 
risk tolerances—from the scene. An FSHC’s incentives to engage in 
trading on its own behalf may not be that different from the incentives of 
a day trader or other short-term speculator. Its activities are not limited to 
short-term trades, however. It may buy long-term bonds, for example, 
including those that are not “investment-grade” and that, therefore, come 
with considerable risk (recall Greek sovereign debt in 2011 and 201262). 
To the extent that these trading and investment activities already carry a 
risk, which they do, the firm is often able to increase that risk, perhaps 
many times over, by using borrowed funds to pursue the activities. A 
common means of obtaining this “leverage” is to engage in so-called re-
po transactions, whereby an FSHC sells assets to a lender on a short-term 
basis (usually overnight) and promises to buy back those assets later, at a 
slightly higher price, with the difference between the sale and purchase 
prices constituting de facto interest.63 From an economic perspective, 
repo transactions are secured loans, but the repo structure may have cer-
tain accounting or tax advantages for the parties.64 FSHCs are able to 
augment their leverage still further through other means, such as reverse 
repos, combined with rehypothecation.65 In those transactions, a firm 
typically lends (“on margin”) to its brokerage clients, such as hedge 
funds and other institutional investors, and those loans are secured 
against the assets in the clients’ brokerage accounts.66 The firm then uses 
that collateral to engage in additional repos to further its own lending or 
trading activities—it, in other words, rehypothecates (repledges) those 
assets.67 
The FSHC’s rationale is not difficult to discern: placing its and its 
clients’ assets on the line brings the hope of outsized rewards, without 
                                                     
 62. See Liz Alderman & Susanne Craig, Europe’s Banks Found Safety of Bonds a Costly Illu-
sion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/11/business/global/sovereign-
debt-turns-sour-in-euro-zone.html; Stephen J. Lubben, Greece’s Sovereign Debt Lesson, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Mar. 22, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/greeces-sovereign-debt-
lesson/. 
 63. Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 546 (2011). 
 64. See Repurchase Agreement, RISKGLOSSARY.COM, http://www.riskglossary.com/link/re 
po.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2012). 
 65. For an explanatory discussion of rehypothecation, see Kenneth C. Kettering, Repledge 
Deconstructed, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 45 (1999). 
 66. See id. at 50–51. 
 67. See id.; Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, The (Sizeable) Role of Rehypothecation in the 
Shadow Banking System 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 10/172, 2010), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2010/wp10172.pdf (“Rehypothecation occurs when the 
collateral posted by a prime brokerage client (e.g., hedge fund) to its prime broker is used as collat-
eral also by the prime broker for its own purposes.”). 
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the firm’s having to concern itself with whether the risk is too great for 
any particular client. After all, it is the firm’s own money (or money that 
it has borrowed), and if the firm is comfortable with substantial risk, then 
that is all that matters. Why would the firm be comfortable? One re-
sponse, coming from the field of behavioral psychology, says that the 
FSHC is willing to assume substantial risk for the same reasons that most 
of us, at one point or another, assume more risk than, logically—and, 
often, in retrospect—we otherwise would.68 We are more inclined than 
not to believe the odds are in our favor.69 That explanation is buttressed 
by another: the FSHC, at the end of the day, is not really using its own 
money, at least not if “ownership” is viewed as beneficial ownership. If 
ownership is so viewed, then the firm is, ultimately, using the sharehold-
ers’ money.70 In any event—and, arguably, more importantly—those 
who make the trades undeniably are not placing their own resources at 
risk.71 That is not to say that the FSHC and its personnel lack ample rea-
son to be cautious. In the event that a proprietary trading strategy has bad 
results, jobs may be on the line, and the prospect of one’s losing one’s 
employment certainly may have a disciplining effect on one’s actions 
with regard to facilitating risky trades. The point remains, however, that 
the firm’s incentives cannot be said to be what they would be if its per-
sonnel’s own assets were at risk. 
As Part IV discusses further, we need to look behind the FSHC’s 
actions to consider the motivations of its employees (its traders, that is). 
As the aftermath of the financial crisis revealed, employees, in their pur-
suit of proprietary trading profits for the firm, did not necessarily set 
their sights on whether their trades or investments ultimately would be 
good, bad, or somewhere in between. Rather, their eyes were more plau-
sibly trained on the next bonus season and the prospect of being reward-
ed based on the value of the trades and investments for which they were 
responsible, even those that were still open at the time of the bonus de-
termination. Because of the use of “mark-to-market” valuations72 in de-
                                                     
 68. See Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Re-
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 71. See id. 
 72. See Mark to Market (MTM), INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
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termining asset managers’ compensation, whether in the FSHC context 
or otherwise, the value of an investment position is typically based on a 
hypothetical: if the firm were to close out the trade today, what amount 
would it fetch for the firm?73 Never mind that if the bubble on which its 
value is based bursts before the trade is actually closed, it may become 
worthless to the firm.  
The method of accounting, however, ultimately has not been the 
problem. The problem has been the short-term compensation structure 
that encourages traders to look no further than the end of the year, after 
which they may or may not remain with the firm.74 In other words, that 
compensation structure does not force risk-takers to reap what they sow. 
Presumably—although there are occasional indications to the contrary—
FSHCs’ proprietary trading activities have slowed somewhat since the 
financial crisis. For example, to the extent that firms’ institutional clients 
are limiting the firms’ ability to rehypothecate, or repo “lenders” are be-
coming more circumspect about the creditworthiness of their counterpar-
ties, that trend seems reasonable and appropriate. Accordingly, proprie-
tary trading may not be quite the heady and all-consuming pastime that it 
once was. However, as J.P. Morgan’s revelation in May 2012 of its 
multibillion-dollar trading loss at the hands of the “London Whale” 
demonstrates,75 proprietary trading remains a driving force of profits—
and, importantly, of compensation—at FSHCs. From a corporate gov-
ernance perspective, therefore, it remains a force to be reckoned with. 
To be sure, the Dodd-Frank Act76 and the rules to be formulated 
and adopted under that statute are to put a stop to, or at least limit, certain 
types of proprietary trading activities in the name of mitigating systemic 
risk. However, the rulemaking process is, as one might expect, laden 
with political maneuvering that may ultimately turn what could have 
been blanket rules into rules that provide for exceptions and admit of 
                                                     
 73. See Liz Rappaport, Bank Quandary: Valuing the Assets, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2011), 
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creative interpretations. In some respects, that result may not be trouble-
some. The zeal behind the Volcker Rule arguably was based as much on 
popular anger and frustration as on an understanding of what sorts of 
activities may actually have adverse systemic implications.77 Still, by 
now the contours of the rule are coming into view, and, consistent with 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s rulemaking mandate,78 they still permit a fairly 
broad swath of proprietary trading activity. For example, although firms 
will be prohibited from myriad short-term trading activities, it appears 
that they will still be permitted to engage in longer term investment and 
trading activities.79 
Moreover, and importantly, the Volcker Rule will not touch upon 
many firms that engage in substantial proprietary trading activities. 
Among other things, the rule will not address firms that are not “systemi-
cally important” (too big to fail), firms whose client and customer assets 
are not guaranteed by the federal government, and firms, such as futures 
commission merchants, whose businesses revolve around financial in-
struments other than securities.80 Indeed, these categories of firms have 
received nary a mention, whether in the immediate aftermath of the fi-
nancial crisis or during the fretting among lawmakers and commentators 
after J.P. Morgan’s disclosure of its massive trading losses.81 Put another 
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way, proprietary trading became a regulatory worry only because of its 
possible effects on the federal treasury and the broader U.S. and global 
economies and not because of its role in exacerbating the already tenuous 
relationship of shareholders to the property on which the value of their 
share holdings is based. Accordingly, if proprietary trading raises special 
concerns for the modern corporation, which it does, then, as this Article 
describes below, recent regulatory developments have not adequately 
addressed them. 
IV. THE MODERN CORPORATION, MAGNIFIED 
FSHCs are special in a number of ways that Berle and Means did 
not obviously consider.82 As suggested in Part III, what is perhaps their 
primary business activity—proprietary trading—further attenuates the 
relationship between ownership and control within the corporation, and 
further alienates shareholders from the property that drives economic 
production. There are a number of factors contributing to that attenuation 
and alienation. This Part discusses four of them, recognizing that the fac-
tors overlap, whether in a temporal or causal sense or both. Specifically, 
it describes the shareholder-adverse distortions of managerial incentives 
that occur once proprietary trading becomes the firm’s most important 
business activity; how those incentives come into play in connection with 
FSHCs’ regulatory compliance and involvement with policymaking and 
rulemaking; how the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that apply when 
an FSHC becomes insolvent worsen shareholders’ plight; and the ways 
in which the multi-entity structures of FSHCs create risks and liabilities 
that are different from those present in other multi-entity structures and 
that likely are not evident to shareholders. 
A. Incentives 
In the corporation of the late 1920s and early 1930s, as Berle and 
Means observed, shareholders faced risk as a result of their inability to 
direct the property of the enterprise toward its most productive uses.83 
Moreover, those who did have that control, the corporation’s directors 
and officers, generally did not have proper incentives to deploy property 
toward its highest and best use for the corporation, to distribute as much 
profit as possible to shareholders, or to maintain investor-favorable mar-
ket conditions.84 That was because, unless the managers were themselves 
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significant shareholders, they would not have received the rewards of 
doing so.85 Hence arose the authors’ concerns over the conflicts of inter-
ests confronting managers and, specifically, managers’ likely incentives 
to control property in a manner furthering interests other than those of 
the shareholders.86 
To be fair, the authors were open-minded on this point. It was not 
necessarily the case that management’s motivating force would always 
be the prospect of achieving profits for themselves.87 There were other 
possibilities. Management might seek power, status, or professional 
achievement. Or, more beneficently, management might be incented to 
use its authority to further the interests of other groups—for example, it 
might serve employees’ interests by improving labor conditions—to a 
degree beyond what would optimize shareholder returns. The most one 
could say with relative certainty was that control’s interests were not 
aligned with shareholders’ interests, a point that Berle and Means deftly 
made with their suggestion that we might learn more about the motives 
of control “by studying the motives of an Alexander the Great, seeking 
new worlds to conquer, than by considering the motives of a petty 
tradesman of the days of Adam Smith.”88 Of course, The Modern Corpo-
ration fully acknowledged that, if one were to specify the primary moti-
vation behind control’s efforts, realizing personal profit was the most 
intuitively plausible candidate.89 
In the context of FSHCs, there is no longer any room for specula-
tion or doubt. What is the lure of proprietary trading, after all, for those 
who research, select, and effect the proprietary trades? As one might ex-
pect, it is not simply that the trades will generate some profit, incremen-
tally adding to the firm’s revenues for the year. It is that the trades will 
generate considerable profits, adding significantly to the firm’s revenues. 
The incentive is such because, at least historically, the employees’ com-
pensation has been designed to ensure that it is such. From the firm’s 
perspective, if it is possible to trade and invest the firm’s own capital 
and, as a result, realize gains of perhaps multiples of what was placed at 
risk, then that is the type of activity that is to be encouraged. The firm 
provides that encouragement through the means used by many nonfinan-
cial firms seeking to shape employees’ incentives beyond what is possi-
ble with only salary-based compensation. It gives them a “piece of the 
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action,” in the form of annual bonuses tied to the profits generated by the 
employees or their division over the course of the year.90 
The incentive provided by the possibility of receiving compensation 
based on any profit that can be achieved is not just different in degree 
from the incentives animating control in The Modern Corporation’s cor-
poration. It is different in kind—a product of the fact that control’s di-
vergent interests, so the argument goes, are no longer something to be 
monitored, controlled, and reined in for the sake of shareholders. That is, 
it is no longer the case that shareholders automatically lose when traders 
further their own interests. Now those divergent interests are something 
to be encouraged and celebrated because, when someone’s trades on be-
half of the firm do well, everybody wins. We might think the concept is 
similar to a firm’s granting stock options to its executives to encourage 
optimal management. There are critical differences, however. 
The problem with proprietary trading lies in the unique risks asso-
ciated with it. Making bets with the prospect of huge reward inevitably is 
the same as making bets with the prospect of huge loss. The trader need 
not recognize or internalize this risk, however. If things get bad enough, 
if the trades are losers and cost the firm dearly, the trader simply gathers 
her belongings and moves on to the next firm and the next opportunity.91 
This outcome differentiates incentive-based compensation associated 
with proprietary trading from stock options because an officer who has 
been granted (out-of-the-money) stock options wins only when the 
shareholders win. There is no situation in which officers benefit but 
shareholders lose, at least to the extent that the “currency” used to pay 
both is one and the same: the value of the firm’s stock. 
B. Regulation 
The divergence of shareholders’ interests from the interests of those 
in control, and the corresponding adverse incentives of the latter group, 
are apparent in the application of regulatory infrastructure to FSHCs’ and 
their subsidiaries’ activities, an arena that presents another challenge for 
FSHC governance. This challenge is more political than structural, but 
there are scant indications that it will be overcome anytime soon. In par-
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ticular, as noted above, FSHCs’ subsidiaries are often heavily regulated, 
whether as brokers, advisers, or banks. Moreover, if a subsidiary is a 
bank, the FSHC will be regulated by the Federal Reserve as a bank hold-
ing company.92 That regulation, one might suppose, is intended to ac-
complish a number of goals, all falling under the general rubrics of cor-
recting one or more perceived market failures or promoting efficiency.93 
That is, regulation is predicated on the notion that, given power and in-
formation imbalances among participants in market transactions, inves-
tors would otherwise be systematically disadvantaged. 
When articulated more granularly, the goals of regulation are gen-
erally considered to be maintaining market integrity, protecting investors, 
and promoting systemic stability.94 These goals should strike a familiar 
chord in anyone who has been a customer or a client of a financial firm. 
Yet applicable regulation has not been working terribly well in recent 
years, assuming that it ever has. The financial crisis alone should demon-
strate that point, but neither the devastation that the crisis caused nor the 
policymaking and analysis that occurred afterward appear to have done 
much to correct the problems. One might discern, and evaluate, regulato-
ry deficiencies from at least a couple of perspectives.  
First, difficulties with FSHC regulation arise, in part, from the ever-
controversial relationship between the regulated and the regulators. The 
relationship arises, and gains reinforcement, both from the “revolving 
door” between government and regulated industries and from regulated 
industries’ lobbying efforts. For example, as others have documented, it 
is not uncommon for SEC staff to secure employment in the private sec-
tor, either within firms that may previously have been subject to those 
staff members’ or their departments’ oversight or within law or account-
ing firms that represent such firms.95 In this regard, the R. Allen Stanford 
fraud, involving an SEC lawyer who had allegedly quashed investiga-
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tions of Mr. Stanford and then obtained employment with Mr. Stanford’s 
firm, comes to mind.96 In addition—and, again, well-documented if not 
otherwise obvious—regulated industries expend substantial resources 
ensuring that their views, favoring fewer or less burdensome regulation 
(as one might suppose), are well represented in policymaking discus-
sions. 
Those expenditures are not without effect, in that there have been 
numerous instances in which financial firms have helped shape regula-
tion. As an earlier (pre-financial crisis) example, the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 1999 eschewed regulation of over-the-counter de-
rivative instruments (credit default swaps, for example), in part at the 
behest of industry.97 More recently, the mortgage industry was alleged to 
have influenced the Federal Reserve in connection with the latter’s reli-
ance, in relaxing credit standards, on a disputed study on racial discrimi-
nation.98 Another example involves Countrywide, the mortgage compa-
ny, which allegedly made “sweetheart” loans to policymakers who, in 
turn, acted favorably toward Fannie Mae, which packaged, for securitiza-
tion purposes, mortgages that Countrywide had originated.99 If we are 
seeking to discern some of the causes of the financial crisis, then, as one 
observer has noted, “it is very hard to imagine that heavily regulated 
banks could have engaged in such extreme risk-taking without the sup-
port of regulators.”100 Accordingly, regulation of FSHCs and their sub-
sidiaries arguably is not as robust as it might otherwise be absent the ef-
fective participation of those firms in determining the scope of regulation 
and how it will be enforced. 
Second, and apart from the presumed close ties between financial 
institutions and their regulators, where financial firms violate their obli-
gations under applicable regulations, regulators arguably are not ade-
quately holding the firms accountable. Recent examples of this phenom-
enon are settlements between the SEC and financial institutions of en-
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forcement actions claiming fraudulent practices.101 In these settlements, 
the firm typically “neither admits nor denies” the relevant charge and 
simply agrees to pay a fine. 102 When evaluating a proposed settlement, 
some judges103—including, most vocally, Judge Rakoff of the Southern 
District of New York—have challenged the SEC’s settlement practices 
on the basis that they constitute no real sanction of the firms, either in a 
monetary or a reputational sense.104 For these courts, therefore, the set-
tlement practices are adverse to the public interest and, beyond that, the 
objectives that justify financial-services regulation in the first place. Hav-
ing paid the applicable fine, firms are free to continue to engage in the 
fraudulent or otherwise illegal practices, viewing the sporadic enforce-
ment actions and associated fines as simply the cost of doing business.105 
Regulators’ contention that their resources are far too insufficient to pur-
sue enforcement actions through to a trial and possibly guilty verdict, 
though perhaps a legitimate concern, does not undermine the broader 
point that regulation of financial firms simply is not what it should be to 
further its professed goals. 
Of course, if we view settlements from the perspective of FSHC 
shareholders, it might seem that a monetary penalty of any amount is 
problematic, as any amount levied will be paid by the firm and, there-
fore, will ultimately be borne by shareholders. Because of that, perhaps 
alternative sanctions would be more desirable from a corporate govern-
ance perspective. Regardless of the form of sanction, however, if that 
sanction fails to fulfill punishment and deterrence roles, it renders regula-
tion ineffective, which, in turn, feeds a bubble not unlike the practice of 
giving away mortgages. Put another way, when regulation is either insuf-
ficient or inadequately enforced, it implicitly encourages excessively 
risky behavior that should be, and otherwise would be, precluded. 
Under the circumstances described above, one of two things may 
eventually happen, both of which were evident in the financial crisis and 
its aftermath. First, firms’ behavior may not adequately account for the 
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externalities that are created—diminished investor confidence, for exam-
ple. Over time, the effects of the behavior on investor confidence may 
reach a tipping point, causing exactly the market crisis that the regulation 
exists to prevent. Second, should persistent excessive behavior finally 
become the subject of regulatory focus, which is particularly likely after 
an egregious instance of regulatory failure but not necessarily only then, 
regulation may increase suddenly and dramatically—and in a manner 
that precludes the firm’s continuing its past practices, whether in part or 
altogether. In either case, the game will ultimately end, with shareholders 
(among others) losing substantially, regardless of the firm’s too-big-to-
fail status or the applicability of government guarantees. 
C. Bankruptcy 
By now, it is beyond dispute that FSHCs’ proprietary trading and 
investment activities sometimes do not work out particularly well. In the 
worst of circumstances, both for an FSHC and its shareholders, the 
firm’s trading activities, based on leverage as they are, lead to the firm’s 
insolvency. Both Bear Stearns and AIG were on the brink of bankruptcy 
before being saved by the U.S. government.106 Lehman Brothers and MF 
Global were less fortunate, ultimately declaring bankruptcy and undergo-
ing reorganization or liquidation processes that, for both firms, have been 
fraught with competing claims and controversy.107 If bankruptcy were 
not bad enough for shareholders, the bankruptcy rules that apply as to 
firms engaged in proprietary trading activities that involve derivative 
instruments or that are funded through repos may further disadvantage 
FSHC shareholders, at least in comparison to shareholders of the sorts of 
firms on which Berle and Means focused. 
The Bankruptcy Code is structured such that, in the event of a 
firm’s bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Code, repo and derivative 
counterparties are prioritized. 108 As Mark Roe details, “[t]he Bankruptcy 
Code allows derivatives and repo creditors, but not most others, to im-
mediately seize and sell off their collateral and to demand and keep eve-
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of-bankruptcy collateral.”109 In practice, according to Roe, the rules cre-
ate lender incentives along the following lines: when a repo or derivative 
counterparty (creditor) believes that an FSHC is in financial trouble, it 
might stop lending to that firm on the basis that it lacks sufficient infor-
mation about the risks the firm poses.110 (That the counterparty lacks that 
information should not be surprising: why should it investigate the 
FSHC’s creditworthiness when the bankruptcy rules provide de facto 
superpriority protection in the event of insolvency?111) Alternatively, the 
counterparty may demand additional collateral from the FSHC—
collateral that will not be subject to avoidance actions (clawback) in the 
event of bankruptcy, even if acquired during the ninety days immediately 
prior to bankruptcy.112 If the counterparty ultimately declares the FSHC 
to be in default and liquidates the collateral, then, when the collateral 
loses value as a result, other counterparties are similarly induced to de-
clare the FSHC in default and to seize and liquidate collateral.113 
These bankruptcy rules were designed to maintain financial stabil-
ity by ensuring liquidity at moments when the credit markets might oth-
erwise seize up.114 That is, Congress sought to address the prospect that 
one firm’s insolvency could cause the insolvencies of its lenders (repo 
and derivatives counterparties), triggering a chain reaction of insolven-
cies.115 Presumably, then, the rules targeted counterparties’ incentives. If 
counterparties are assured that they will be paid what is due to them in 
the event of a firm’s insolvency, then they will be inclined to keep lend-
ing—thereby promoting market liquidity—in the face of possible mar-
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ket-wide financial instability.116 As various observers point out, however, 
by effectively providing a “bankruptcy subsidy” to firms that provide 
financing to FSHCs, the bankruptcy rules, in many respects, redound to 
the detriment of financial stability.117 The incentive for lenders to stop 
lending because they are uncertain about the stability of their counterpar-
ties, or to declare default and liquidate collateral belonging to those 
counterparties, actually enhances the possibility of the proverbial run on 
the bank.118 In other words, lenders are motivated to take rather extreme 
measures at the first sign of difficulties, including selling assets, which 
only spreads concerns and causes others to take similar defensive 
measures.119 
To be sure, those consequences, given their systemic implications, 
are problematic, particularly with the financial crisis so fresh in our 
minds. There is more to the story, however, relating to the effects of the-
se bankruptcy rules on other creditors. In a sense, this is simple. Prioritiz-
ing one type of creditor in an FSHC bankruptcy disadvantages other 
creditors. When a firm becomes insolvent, it has only so many resources 
with which to pay creditors’ claims. If some creditors, such as repo lend-
ers, will be fully paid (or close to it) because, for example, last-minute 
transfers to those creditors will not be subject to avoidance actions, then 
other creditors, such as vendors and tort claimants and landlords, will 
receive less than they otherwise would have.120 That may not be much of 
a concern if those other types of creditors were incentivized to be more 
diligent and skeptical in their own involvement with FSHCs. If other 
creditors know that a bankruptcy proceeding will leave them with the 
short end of the stick, then, ideally, they will negotiate for control, moni-
toring rights, an easy out of the relationship, and other assurances.121 If 
those other creditors “react well” to the rules, in other words, there might 
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be minimal social costs to the preferences granted to repo and derivative 
counterparties.122 
Apart from the issue of how well other creditors react to the priori-
tizing rules,123 however, is the fact that reacting—whether well, poorly, 
or otherwise—is simply not a possibility for shareholders. That circum-
stance further accentuates Berle and Means’s concerns about the modern 
corporation. Although shareholders, as an FSHC’s equity owners, are not 
creditors in the sense that they do not fit into the cascade of priority that 
has to be determined in any bankruptcy (other than that they “fit” into the 
back of the line),124 they nonetheless have a claim on the too small pie 
that remains after a firm has declared bankruptcy. The greater a bankrupt 
FSHC’s reliance on repo and derivative financing, the smaller becomes 
the pie to be divvied up by everyone else, which of course includes the 
shareholders. This problematic result, again, is not one with which 
shareholders of non-FSHCs must generally contend, at least not to the 
same extent. The bankruptcy rules become still more problematic for 
shareholders to the extent that other claimants to “superpriority” treat-
ment exist at the time of the bankruptcy, such as the clients or customers 
of the subsidiaries’ financial-services operations. 
D. Subsidiaries 
Another source of risk for FSHC shareholders derives from the fact 
that the holding company is just that: a parent company with a number of 
subsidiaries. Therefore, although we might be prone to think of Morgan 
Stanley, for example, as a single enterprise, it is most definitely not a 
single entity. Rather, the enterprise that is Morgan Stanley comprises the 
parent company and subsidiaries housing the firm’s various operating 
units. Generally, each operating unit is defined by its particular func-
tion—whether the unit acts as a broker–dealer or as an investment advis-
er, for example—and possibly also (or instead) by the country in which 
the unit is based. So, for example, there is Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, 
Morgan Stanley Capital Partners III, Inc., Morgan Stanley Distribution, 
Inc., Morgan Stanley Investment Management (Japan) Co., Ltd., Morgan 
Stanley Global Emerging Markets, Inc., Morgan Stanley Investment 
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Management, Inc., and Morgan Stanley Infrastructure, Inc., just to name 
a small portion of the entities in the Morgan Stanley “family” of compa-
nies. 
The rationale for the parent–subsidiary structure is evident. As not-
ed in Part III, apart from the circumstance that entity separation allows 
separate regulation and ostensibly helps diminish potential conflicts of 
interest, separation serves the obvious objective of liability protection. 
As any shareholder should know, the corporate form is desirable because 
it shields shareholders from liability beyond the amount that they paid 
for their shares. That important aspect of the corporate form can be de-
ployed within an enterprise, in the ubiquitous parent–subsidiary relation-
ship, to offset liabilities against a circumscribed bundle of assets. To be 
sure, the parent–subsidiary structure is effective in cabining liabilities 
only if other conditions hold. In particular, the parent company, as the 
subsidiary’s sole shareholder, must respect the subsidiary’s “corporate 
formalities,” ensure that the subsidiary is adequately capitalized, and 
otherwise respect the subsidiary as a separate entity unto itself.125 If the 
parent company does so, then, when a subsidiary creditor attempts to 
“pierce” the subsidiary’s “corporate veil” by asserting that, in fact, the 
parent company should be obligated on the subsidiary’s liabilities, courts 
should respect the planning purposes behind the subsidiary’s exist-
ence.126 
Although there may be many legitimate reasons for financial firms 
to use the parent–subsidiary structure, that structure may further militate 
against the interests of parent-company shareholders. The subsidiaries, 
again, are typically the entities actually providing securities-related and 
other financial services to others, whether those “others” be labeled cli-
ents, customers, or investors. The subsidiaries are, in other words, the 
locus of the creation of value in the Berle-and-Means sense—that is, op-
erations-based value, as opposed to investment and trading-based value. 
Yet, in light of the enterprise’s structure, the subsidiaries have the status 
of discrete assets that are owned and controlled by the parent company. 
The result of that circumstance is the further attenuation of managerial 
accountability to shareholders. After all, although a subsidiary’s man-
agement must be accountable to that entity’s shareholders, those share-
holders generally consist only of the parent company and perhaps a few 
other affiliated entities. Of course, the parent company’s management, in 
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its dealings with the subsidiary, must be accountable to its own (public) 
shareholders. However, where the parent company itself has no meaning-
ful operations and, instead, pursues trading and investment for its own 
account, as is often the case with FSHCs, there may be few competing 
needs or countervailing forces to constrain management’s pursuit of trad-
ing profits at the expense of operational value. Indeed, anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that the parent company’s management may be inclined 
to ignore most aspects of its subsidiaries’ business operations.127 
Furthermore, this dual separation of operations and corporate gov-
ernance obligations in the parent–subsidiary structure raises the prospect 
of unrestrained conflicts between the parent company’s (and its man-
agement’s) interests, on one hand, and the subsidiaries’ interests, on the 
other. In fact, as became evident during the financial crisis, FSHCs 
commonly rely on subsidiaries’ operations to support their proprietary 
trading activities.128 Specifically, with the blessing of applicable laws and 
regulations, financial firms may borrow funds that subsidiary clients and 
customers have deposited with the firm. The parent company of a futures 
commission merchant might, for example, engage in so-called “internal 
repo” transactions with a subsidiary, whereby the parent company sells 
assets to client or customer accounts in exchange for cash or other assets 
in those accounts, with the promise that the FSHC will buy the assets 
back from the accounts the next day.129 Or the parent company of a bro-
ker–dealer might use assets that customers previously pledged to the 
broker (in exchange for “margin” loans) to engage in repos with third 
parties, as described in Part III.130 Although the subsidiaries are legally 
separate from the parent company, there remains substantial latitude in 
the parent company’s ability to use assets that neither it nor its subsidiar-
ies own for the purposes of its own trading—and, to the extent there has 
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been little risk of shareholder sanction, firms have likely done so routine-
ly.131 
At first blush, these lending activities may not seem too worrisome 
from the perspective of FSHC shareholders, in that the activities may not 
seem likely to adversely affect the firm. As suggested above, however, if 
the firm becomes insolvent, these arrangements may have a detrimental 
effect on the firm’s limited remaining value. In particular, as a broad 
generalization, subsidiaries’ activities have not been of the sort that 
might lead to the downfall of the enterprise. A subsidiary’s bankruptcy, 
for example, is not likely to bankrupt the entire enterprise. More im-
portantly, given what the subsidiaries typically do—perform brokerage, 
lending, market-making, or advisory services and hedge any risk arising 
from those activities—those entities arguably are not any more likely to 
face bankruptcy than are other types of companies. Rather, bankruptcy 
risk within the enterprise arguably emanates from the parent company, 
which, again, focuses its profit-earning efforts on its own trading strate-
gies.132 Think Bear Stearns. Think Lehman Brothers. Think MF Global. 
As to each of those firms, it was the firm’s unhedged bets on certain as-
set classes or credits that caused a crisis of confidence among lenders and 
clients, which, in turn, led to a “run on the bank” and, ultimately, either 
government rescue or bankruptcy.133 
Of course, the parent company’s bankruptcy, on its own, is a devas-
tating event for shareholders, who stand in line behind creditors and pre-
ferred shareholders for whatever might be left of the estate.134 Based on 
recent examples, the prospect that there will be anything left—which, in 
many bankruptcy contexts, is at least a reasonable one—may be less like-
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ly in the FSHC context because of the interrelationships between the 
FSHC and its subsidiaries, suggested above. When a firm enters bank-
ruptcy, the easy movement of assets between and among subsidiaries 
suddenly stops. If the subsidiaries, in addition to the parent company, are 
in bankruptcy (and absent a “substantive consolidation” of the 
ties135), transfers of assets and cash through fluid boundaries are replaced 
by a battle among the discrete and separate entities—and, more precisely, 
their creditors—making claims against one another for sums owed.136 
Moreover, value may be depleted from the parent company as a result of 
legitimate claims from the subsidiaries’ financial-services clients and 
customers. Among other things, clients of brokerage subsidiaries have 
claimed that the parent company did not repay loans made by client ac-
counts (the internal repos previously mentioned) and that it inappropri-
ately commingled client assets with those of the parent company.137 In 
any of those circumstances, the subsidiary may (on behalf of its clients, 
customers, or creditors) have a legitimate entitlement to the parent com-
pany’s assets and, as with any creditor of the parent company, priority 
over parent-company shareholders.  
V. REORIENTATION OF FINANCIAL-SERVICES HOLDING COMPANIES 
If managers have no meaningful stake in the enterprise or corre-
sponding incentive to use property so as to further its highest value, and 
if their interests are in competition with shareholders’, then perhaps it is 
time to overcome any pretense that the control–shareholder relationship 
at all approximates the rights and obligations that used to be consolidated 
within the sole proprietorship or small partnership. Similarly, if what 
shareholders buy when they buy shares of stock are tokens bearing only a 
remote relationship to property, as historically understood, and if share-
holders simply trade those tokens with hardly a thought about what they 
represent, then maybe it is time to rethink the notion of shareholder pri-
macy. Under these circumstances, maybe “control” should, instead, be 
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charged with furthering the interests of a broad range of stakeholders, 
reflecting that the corporation now plays a dominating, constitutive role 
within the political community. 
Regardless of whether Berle and Means would have characterized 
their argument in exactly that fashion, it can surely be said that, under 
their analysis, the modern corporation’s upending the incentives that ac-
company the unity of ownership and control calls for refocusing the pur-
pose and objectives of corporate action. If that is the case, then there 
arises the further question of what conclusion one might draw from the 
souped-up corporation that is the FSHC. Can we say anything additive to 
or different from the authors’ conclusions when we speak of firms as to 
which shareholders are still further removed from value-producing prop-
erty or where there, in fact, exists no value-producing property at all? 
Certainly it would seem that the authors’ conclusions were not intended 
to encompass all large corporations for all time. They readily acknowl-
edged that the suggestions they proffered may not capture all concerns 
that conceivably could arise from the separation of ownership and con-
trol and, indeed, that the specific concerns occupying their attention 
“may become academic within another generation.”138 
Accordingly, it is worth considering whether, and in what way, 
FSHCs fit within The Modern Corporation’s framework and what fur-
ther possibilities may exist in the FSHC context for reuniting the ele-
ments of economic production with our social and political needs. To-
ward that end, it may be useful to recall that The Modern Corporation’s 
evocative proposition—that corporate law “may be considered as a po-
tential constitutional law”139—is a reaction to a structural transformation 
of enterprise that had distorted common, core assumptions about private 
property and capitalism. If economic production has lost as its primary 
motivation the furtherance of owners’ private, pecuniary interests, then, 
in order to properly orient the world again, a new approach for channel-
ing incentives has to be determined. If, as it would seem, management 
cannot be made to prioritize shareholders’ interests, then what should it 
be made to prioritize? Quite plausibly, there is only one answer. If corpo-
rations are, and will doubtlessly remain, so powerful, then they should be 
trustees of sorts for society as a whole, meaning all of its myriad constit-
uencies. Also quite plausibly, the authors’ proposal is not affected by 
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whether the subject of analysis is a corporation within their immediate 
lines of sight or whether it is a modern FSHC. 
Without wading too deeply into the extensive literature on broaden-
ing corporations’ horizons and encouraging more socially responsible 
propensities, one might reasonably suggest that The Modern Corpora-
tion’s proposed alternative comes with its own considerable challenges. 
One of them is evaluative. In particular, if, by virtue of its permeating all 
social interaction, the corporation is (or should be) a publicly oriented 
organization serving the interests of everyone, can we ever ascertain 
whether it is actually promoting the interests of anyone? This question is 
particularly acute given that, as compared with citizens’ relationship to 
political authority, a corporation’s various constituent groups have mark-
edly dissimilar relationships to the corporation and its management. The 
query, moreover, only begins to scratch the surface of relevant analyses. 
The Modern Corporation raised innumerable avenues of exploration, 
which lead to no easy conclusions. In thinking about FSHCs, however, 
there may be approaches that allow us to avoid that thicket while still 
alleviating the FSHC-specific concerns articulated in Part IV. 
In other words, stopping short of embracing the implications that 
Berle and Means drew from their observations or, indeed, reaching a 
conclusion about them at all, perhaps we can discern measures that 
would discipline management and provide greater incentives for them to 
act in the interests of firm value and, importantly for FSHCs, firm stabil-
ity. If FSHCs are a magnified version of the corporations of an earlier 
era, as this Article has posited, then we might, at the very least, consider 
how FSHCs can be returned to actual size, as it were. Toward that end, 
and in light of the threat to long-term value that arises from FSHCs’ tra-
ditional proprietary trading activities, the objectives of responsible cor-
porate governance could be furthered by a governance paradigm that re-
volves around not only profit generation but also the interests of those 
who use the traditional business services that financial firms provide—
namely, the firms’ clients and customers. 
Such a reorientation may initially seem to subvert the traditional 
and expected focus on returns to owners, but the sensibility of the sug-
gestion should become apparent when one considers that some of the 
more substantial risks to shareholders of FSHCs arise in connection with 
the firms’ work on behalf of clients and customers and the conflicts those 
operations create. That is, significant (additional) tensions between own-
ership and control arise as a result of activities that are enabled by the 
firms’ relationships with clients and customers, whether directly or 
through controlled subsidiaries. Among other things, FSHCs generally 
do not face meaningful limitations regarding their ability to use client 
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and customer assets for their own trading and investment purposes. If 
management of FSHCs owed stronger duties to those who place assets 
with the firms and their subsidiaries as clients and customers, presuma-
bly that would mute the firms’ incentives to influence regulatory action 
and manipulate regulations; promote greater caution in management’s 
use of third-party (client and customer) assets for firm purposes, such as 
in internal repo transactions; and lower the number or reduce the signifi-
cance of competing claims to firm assets in the event of bankruptcy. In 
the too-big-to-fail context, there would also be less risk of crises requir-
ing government intervention at taxpayers’ expense. 
In short, modifying the subject of management’s obligations could 
have an ameliorative effect on management’s incentives to engage in 
reckless and value-reducing proprietary trading activities. Those activi-
ties, after all, substantially arise from not-so-subtle conflicts between 
management’s interests and those of clients and customers, and man-
agement’s exploitation of information advantages vis-à-vis clients and 
customers.140 More closely aligning management activities with client 
and customer interests will serve to better and more meaningfully align 
management’s incentives with shareholder interests. That is to say, like 
clients and customers, shareholders are substantially harmed when the 
firm’s dogged focus on generating trading profits leads to insolvency. 
Admittedly, this proposal, while realigning managerial motivations, 
would not affect FSHC shareholders’ hyper-attenuated relationship with 
property. That, in turn, suggests that we cannot easily ignore or move 
past Berle and Means’s more far-reaching proposal. However, this pro-
posal may be a critical, yet workable, interim step, particularly in cir-
cumstances in which the risks to shareholders are especially pronounced. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Modern Corporation’s astute articulation of the implications of 
the separation of ownership and control for traditional notions of private 
property remain important today, albeit in new and different contexts. As 
the authors speculated, their concerns have taken on a new character, as 
the roles of corporations have continued to evolve in response to new 
ways of doing business. Today, FSHCs starkly support the notion that 
                                                     
 140. Goldman Sachs’ 2007 sales of certain collateralized debt obligations based in subprime 
mortgages come to mind. See In re The Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215–VCG, 
2011 WL 4826104, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011). As one commentator describes it, “[t]he firm 
constructed the securities to be sold to its investors while failing to disclose that it was taking short 
positions against them.” See Peter J. Henning, The Litigation that Haunts Goldman Sachs, N.Y. 
TIMES DEALBOOK (June 25, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/the-litigation-that-
haunts-goldman-sachs. 
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what shareholders own can hardly be thought of as property in the way it 
once was. Moreover, FSHCs subject those shareholders to unique risks, 
which arise from the firms’ proprietary trading activities, combined with 
the roles the firms play in their own regulation, their employee compen-
sation practices, applicable bankruptcy rules, and the proliferation of fi-
nancial-services subsidiaries. Accordingly, in the spirit of The Modern 
Corporation, it may be time to begin thinking about a reorientation of the 
financial-services holding company. In particular, this Article has sug-
gested that FSHC governance should, as an initial matter, more expressly 
attend to financial-services clients and customers, the FSHC-specific 
constituency that (unwittingly) enables and facilitates the risks these 
firms pose to their shareholders and, indeed, to all of their constituencies. 
